We provide evidence from a large number of countries which demonstrates the changing nature of the finance-growth nexus. Specifically, we show that financial depth is no longer a significant determinant of long-run growth. Instead we find evidence to suggest that certain financial reforms have sizeable growth effects, which can be positive or negative depending on how well banks are regulated and supervised.
Introduction
Recent research suggests that the impact of finance on growth is, at best, weakening (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) and, at worst, turning negative once financial development exceeds a certain threshold (Arcand et al., 2011) .
1 This paper confirms that the financegrowth nexus is indeed changing using a rich database on financial reforms covering 91 countries over 1973 -2004 (Abiad et al., 2008 . Specifically, we show that financial depth is no longer a significant determinant of long-run growth. Instead we find evidence to suggest that certain financial reforms have sizeable growth effects, which can be positive or negative depending on how well banks are regulated and supervised. Our findings warn against the use of composite measures of financial liberalisation; in fact, we show that a composite index of financial liberalisation has no independent effect on growth.
Data and Methods
Our study includes data on financial and macroeconomic aggregates from the 2009 edition of the World Development Indicators database for 84 countries for the period 1975-2004 , combined with indicators of financial liberalization from Abiad et al. (2008) . 2 Our measure of financial depth is liquid liabilities less narrow money (M3 less M1), which removes the pure transactions component from liquid liabilities to isolate the intensity of 1 Earlier concerns about the finance-growth relationship include the direction of causality (e.g., Demetriades and Hussein, 1996) and its variability across income groups (e.g., Rioja and Valev, 2004) .
financial intermediation.
3
The main analysis consists of a series of cross-sectional regressions in the style of King and Levine (1993) that take the form
where Y it is the growth of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, F it is a measure of financial depth, FL it is an indicator of financial liberalization or reform, and X it is a set of explanatory variables that have been shown to be robust determinants of growth. The X variables include the log of initial real per capita GDP, which captures convergence, the log of the initial secondary school enrollment rate, which reflects investment in human capital, and the ratios of trade (i.e., imports plus exports) and government expenditure to GDP.
We utilize an overall composite index of financial liberalization, which is the sum of seven individual reform components measured on a scale ranging from 0-3 where 3
represents the highest degree of liberalisation. The seven components are the strength of banking supervision, the ease of bank entry, the absence of distortions in credit allocation including the absence of high reserve requirements (ease of credit controls), the sophistication of securities markets, and the extent of privatisation, interest rate liberalisation and capital account openness.
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over five-year periods. To reduce simultaneity bias we use initial values from the start of each five-year period for all explanatory variables. All panel estimates include time fixed effects.
3 Credit allocated to the private sector is a common alternative measure of financial development used in the literature on finance and growth. We prefer M3-M1 because it is more consistently measured across countries and over time, and this is critical for interpreting the cross-sectional and time variation in the data that drive the comparisons we make. When we use private credit in place of M3-M1 in our empirical specifications, the results are qualitatively identical. -periods, 1975-89 and 1990-2004 Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) show that the finance-growth nexus remains intact for countries able to avoid financial crises. Indeed, there is considerable evidence suggesting that financial liberalisation is often followed by crises, particularly when financial regulation and supervision are not strengthened at the same time. This dates back to the 'sequencing' literature, which emphasises that banking supervision is critical to the success of financial liberalisation (McKinnon, 1991; Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990) .
Empirical Results
Interestingly, the composite index of financial liberalisation includes 'banking supervision' as one of its components. This encompasses aspects of both supervision and regulation, including the independence of bank supervisors, the effectiveness of supervision and the adoption of Basel capital standards. Thus in some sense the composite index is more a broad index of financial reforms than a pure liberalisation index. It is, therefore, potentially more promising to explore whether the individual components, including banking supervision, can help to recover the influence of financial development on growth in the 1990-2004 period.
To this end, Table 2 introduces the individual components of the index into the baseline regression. The first column includes all the components, although it must be recognised that this specification may be susceptible to problems of multicollinearity since the individual components are correlated. 4 We reverse the banking supervision component to capture weakness, which helps to make our point more clearly (thus, weakness of banking supervision takes the value 0 when banking supervision is at its best and +3 when it is at its worst). This model indeed confirms that banking supervision may indeed be a 'supervariable' -it is highly significant and has the expected sign. Moreover, the financial depth variable remains insignificant throughout. Two of the other components are significant at the 5% level: ease of credit controls, which enters with a positive sign, and extent of privatisation, with a negative sign. Given the potential for multicollinearity, we also enter each of the components of the index separately. Weakness of banking supervision, which is included on its own in column 2, is now significant at the 1% level and continues to have the expected negative sign. Ease of credit controls remains positive and highly significant, and extent of privatisation continues to have a negative sign but is now significant at only the 10% level.
5 Table 3 provides more direct evidence on our main hypothesis by interacting weakness of banking supervision with each of the other components of the index, which also enters linearly in each regression. We are thus able to examine whether the effects of 4 The correlation coefficients between the individual components entered in this model range (in absolute values) from 0.316 to 0.639. 5 In an earlier version of this paper, we carried out a similar analysis to what is presented in Table 2 for 1975-89. This showed that all reforms measures were statistically insignificant other than securities markets. In the case of banking supervision, however, its insignificance in the earlier period reflects low values and a general lack of identifying variation.
individual reforms depend on the regulatory and supervisory framework. Columns 1-6 present the relevant results. All the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant, often at the 1% level. Moreover, the effect of financial depth remains negligible and insignificant. These findings confirm clearly that our main conjecture is valid: pro-market financial reforms can have negative effects on growth in economies with weak regulation and supervision. The reform variables themselves are positive but are statistically significant only in two cases: ease of credit controls and securities markets. Taken at face value, these results suggest that these two types of reforms may help to increase growth if the regulatory and supervisory framework is not too weak. Given the potential for multicollinearity between various reform measures, however, we hesitate to conclude which of the reform measures work better from these results alone. To shed further light on the most likely 'winners', column 7 in Table 3 
Summary and concluding remarks
We provide new evidence which confirms that the finance-growth relationship has been changing. Regressors 1975 Regressors -2004 Regressors 1975 Regressors -1989 Regressors 1990 Regressors -2004 Liquid 
